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Abstract
According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more funda-
mental than absolute confidence. In a pair of recent papers, Stefánsson
has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal
confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s
proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think
that comparativism cannot handle intepersonal comparisons; and that
the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking
about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which
comparativists propose—specifically, we should think of confidence as
a dimensionless quantity.
1 Introduction
Contrast two kinds of confidence states. On the one hand there’s compar-
ative confidence; this includes those states that we might attribute using,
for example, ‘is more confident that P than that Q’ or ‘is just as confident
that P as that Q’. It is an essentially comparative attitude directed towards
two (or more) propositions, and does not come in degrees. On the other
hand there’s absolute confidence; this includes those states that we might
attribute using, for example, ‘is confident to degree x that P ’, or ‘is very
doubtful that Q’. Absolute confidence is always directed towards a single
proposition, and comes with some (possibly imprecise) degree that’s often
represented using values between 0 and 1.
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Comparative and absolute confidence are obviously closely related to one
another—the interesting question is how. According to comparativism, com-
parative confidence is strictly more fundamental than absolute confidence.
Indeed, comparativists typically think that comparative confidence ought to
be treated as one of the fundamental theoretical concepts in decision theory
and epistemology. On this picture, absolute confidence is usually seen as a
kind of ‘theoretical construct’, a numerical index the primary function of
which is to represent where in the overall system of an agent’s comparative
confidences each proposition happens to sit relative to the others.
In a pair of recent papers in this journal, Stefánsson (2017; 2018) has de-
fended comparativism, in particular against objections raised by Meacham
and Weisberg (2011). One of those objections concerns whether compara-
tivism is capable of explaining interpersonal comparisons of confidence—for
instance, whether it has the resources to make sense of one agent’s hav-
ing more confidence regarding some proposition P than another agent does
regarding Q.
I will take it for granted that these kinds of interpersonal confidence
comparisons are both meaningful and theoretically valuable, and after go-
ing over some background on comparativism and Stefánsson’s proposed ex-
planation of interpersonal comparisons of confidence, I will argue for three
main conclusions. I’ll first argue that the proposal is not compelling; in-
deed, it provides no strong reasons to think that comparativism can handle
interpersonal comparisons after all (§3). Then, I will argue that we have
good general reasons to think that comparativism cannot plausibly handle
interpersonal comparisons (§4–§5). And finally, I will argue that the best
explanation involves thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different
way than that which comparativism proposes (§6). We ought to see abso-
lute confidence as a dimensionless quantity, one which is measured not by
reference to an underlying comparative confidences but via its relationship
with utility.
2 Background
For each agent α, read ‘P %α Q’ as saying that α’s confidence regarding
P is at least as great as her confidence regarding Q. We will refer to %α
as α’s confidence ranking. We let ‘∼α’ designate the as much confidence
relation, and ‘α’ the more confidence relation. For the sake of simplicity,
we will assume that %α is transitive and complete over all propositions;
hence we’ll treat ∼α and α as the symmetric and asymmetric parts of %α
respectively. Also for simplicity, I’ll pretend throughout that there are only
finitely many propositions. We use ‘>’ and ‘⊥’ to designate a tautology and
a contradiction respectively.
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Say that a real-valued function on propositions f is an order-preserving
measure of %α just in case
f(P ) ≥ f(Q) iff P %α Q
That is, f orders propositions numerically in the same way that %α orders
those propositions by confidence. Next, define a probability function, p, as
any real-valued function on propositions satisfying:
Normalisation. p(>) = 1
Non-Negativity. p(P ) ≥ 0
Additivity. If P,Q are mutually exclusive, then p(P ∨Q) = p(P ) + p(Q)
Say that %α is coherent just in case at least one probability function is an
order-preserving measure of %α; and furthermore say that %α is continuous
just in case no more than one is probability function is an order-preserving
measure of %α.
It has long been known that if %α is coherent and continuous, then it’s
in principle possible for comparativists to give some potential meaning to
the idea of distances in degrees of confidence. The key observation relates
primarily to Additivity, which implies that if %α is coherent, then the dis-
junction of mutually exclusive propositions can be treated as a kind of qual-
itative analogue of addition with respect to %α. Given this, comparativist
can (and usually do) follow a standard methodology from the theory of mea-
surement to provide truth conditions for claims about ratios of differences
between degrees of confidence entirely in terms of comparative confidences.1
To see how this would go in practice, assume that %α is coherent and
continuous. Then we can say, for instance,
Twice Distance. Where P %α Q and R %α S, the distance between α’s
confidence in P and Q is at least twice the distance between R and S,
if there are X,Y, Z such that:
1. X %α (Y ∨ Z) and Y ∼α Z
2. P ∼α (Q ∨X) and R ∼α (S ∨ Y )
3. Y,Z are mutually exclusive, as are Q,X, and S, Y
1 For detailed discussions of this methodology aimed at philosophical audiences, see
(Fine 1973, pp. 68ff), (Stefánsson 2017; 2018), and (Elliott 2020; forthcominga); for a for-
mal treatment, see (Krantz et al. 1971, especially pp. 199–21). The same methodology can
also be used to give truth conditions for claims about ratios (not just ratios of differences)
whenever %α is coherent and continuous. This is not noted in (Stefánsson 2017), but
the fact is exploited in (Stefánsson 2018). It won’t make any difference to my arguments
whether we think that confidence is measurable on nothing stronger than an interval scale,
or if we think that it’s measurable on a ratio scale. I focus on ratios of differences only
because that’s the focus in (Stefánsson 2017).
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To flesh that out: where these conditions are satisfied, then the compara-
tivist would typically say that the confidence α has in X is just the amount
of confidence one would need to ‘add’ to her confidence in Q to get her
confidence in P . Since α has the same confidence regarding the disjoint Y
and Z, and at least as much confidence in X as in Y ∨Z, the comparativist
will say that α has at least twice as much confidence in X as in Y . Given
that, and since the confidence she has in Y is just the distance between her
confidence in R and in S, the result is that the distance between P and Q
is at least twice the distance between R and S.
Now it’s crucial to note here that Twice Confidence makes no mention
of how %α is measured. If f is an order-preserving measure of %α, then it
must accurately represent that the conditions stated in Twice Confidence
are satisfied. But an order-preserving measure f need not be such that the
difference between the values assigned to P and to Q is at least twice the
difference between the values assigned to R and to S. We should like a
measure that does this; hence, say that f is an interval-preserving measure
of %α whenever it is an order-preserving measure of %α and also adequately
represents what we’ve determined to be the truth conditions for claims about
ratios of differences in the desired form.
For example, where %α is coherent, and the probability function p is an
order-preserving measure of it, then p will be an interval-preserving measure
of %α. From conditions 1, 3 of Twice Confidence,
p(X) ≥ p(Y ) + p(Z), and p(Y ) = p(Z)
∴ p(X) ≥ 2p(Y )
And then from 2, 3,
p(P ) = p(Q) + p(X), and p(R) = p(S) + p(Y )




If %α is also continuous, then p will be the unique interval-preserving mea-
sure of %α on the 0-to-1 interval (i.e., the extremities of %α will be assigned
0 and 1, with all other values falling between); furthermore, f will be an
interval-preserving measure of %α if and only if f is some positive affine
transformation of p.2
On the basis of these facts, Stefánsson (2017) argues for the following:
(a) The thesis of probabilism amounts to the claim that ideally rational
agents will have coherent confidence rankings.
2 That is, f is a positive affine transformation of f ′ just in case for all P , f(P ) =
rf ′(P ) + c, for r > 0 and any constant c. Except in the case where c = 0, any positive
affine transformation of p will violate Additivity. So positive affine transformations of
a probability function won’t necessarily preserve ratios between the values that function
assigns—but they will preserve ratios of differences, and that’s all we need for our purposes.
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(b) Comparativism can explain distances in degrees of confidence, at least
for agents whose confidence rankings are coherent and continuous.
(c) Comparativism can explain interpersonal confidence comparisons, at
least between agents whose confidence rankings are coherent and con-
tinuous.
I have discussed (a) and (b) elsewhere, and I think there are good reasons to
doubt both. (See Elliott forthcominga.) But I’m not going to discuss either
of them directly in this paper, so let’s assume for the sake of argument that
they’re both true. How do we get from there to interpersonal comparisons?
Well, Stefánsson writes the following (with notation altered for consis-
tency):
... let me explain why we Comparativists need not give up inter-
personal facts about strength of belief, contrary to what Meacham
and Weisberg claim. That is, we can make sense of claims like ‘α
is more confident that it will rain than β is’ in terms of α’s and
β’s comparative belief relations. (2017, p. 581)
The proposed explanation proceeds as follows.
It is generally assumed that ... subjective probabilities (which
represent strengths of belief) are interpersonally comparable ...
The crucial difference between desires and beliefs in this regard
is the widely held assumption that any two rational people be-
lieve equally strongly whatever they fully believe (such as a tau-
tology), and, similarly, believe equally strongly whatever they
believe least of all... (p. 581)
In this passage, for α to ‘fully believe’ P means that P is maximal in %α. So
the ‘widely held assumption’ is that if α and β are both rational—specifically,
in the sense of having coherent confidence rankings %α and %β—then if
P sits at the top (bottom) of %α and Q sits at the top (bottom) of %β,
then α’s confidence regarding P is not only comparable with but equal to
β’s confidence regarding Q. Let’s refer to this as Min-Max Equality.
Stefánsson offers no support for the assumption, and if you’re worried about
whether comparativists can take Min-Max Equality for granted in the
present dialectical context, then good: you should be. But we’ll come back
to that soon enough.
So now suppose that %α and %β are not only coherent but also con-
tinuous, with pα and pβ being the probability functions that represent %α
and %β respectively. Accordingly, for both agents and for any P , there is a
well-defined notion of distance between P and >, the latter of which will
always sit at the very top of both α’s and β’s confidence rankings. Thus,
Stefánsson notes that if Min-Max Equality is true,
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... we might compare the degree to which α believes P with the
degree to which β believes Q, by comparing the distance between
P and the tautology according to α with the distance between
Q and the tautology according to β. (p. 582)
The suppressed premise here is that since α and β have the same degree
of confidence as one another for > and for ⊥, the distance between > and
⊥ will be the same for each—and therefore any fraction of that distance
will likewise be equal. Hence, α’s confidence in P is at least as great as β’s
confidence in Q just in case
pα(>)− pα(P ) ≤ pβ(>)− pβ(Q),
which is exactly whenever pα(P ) ≥ pβ(Q). Furthermore,
The result of the above comparison is the same across different
numerical models of α’s and β’s comparative beliefs. That is,
if α believes P more strongly than β believes Q according to
one of these models, then the same holds according to all of
these models. [...] And (to repeat) it is a good general principle
to accept as real any feature that is shared by all models of a
real phenomenon. Hence, since all models of rational comparative
belief relations agree when it comes to interpersonal comparisons,
I suggest that we Comparativists take such features to be real...
(p. 582)
Note the implication here: pα and pβ belong to ‘the same numerical model’,
and because the same kind of comparison can consistently be made across
‘all models’, they therefore count as ‘real’. Stefánsson doesn’t explain what
he means in describing two functions as belonging to the same model, but
the idea seems to be this:
Same Model. Where %α,%β are coherent and continuous, fα and fβ be-
long to the same model iff, relative to the same n-to-m interval, fα and
fβ are the unique interval-preserving measures of %α and %β respec-
tively.
Thus, pα and pβ belong to the same model. If we were to apply some positive
affine transformation to, say, pα but not pβ, then we’d end up with different
models for α and β, which would invalidate drawing any interpersonal com-
parisons between them on the basis of those models (cf. List 2003 pp. 232–4,
on interpersonal level and unit comparisons).
For example, for any r, let t(r) = 9r+1. Where previously we might have
said that α has less confidence in P than β does in > because
pα(P ) = 0.5 < pβ(>) = 1,
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= 5.5 > pβ(Q) = 1
To re-validate the comparisons, we just need to apply t to both pα and pβ










Hence, again: f and f ′ belong to ‘the same model’ just in case they’re
the unique interval-preserving measures of %α and %β on the same n-to-m
interval—and as above, ‘any feature that is shared by all models of a real
phenomenon’ is itself ‘real’.
3 Comparing Mass and Volume
Almost all the heavy-lifting in the foregoing proposal is being done by Min-
Max Equality, and inasmuch as that assumption is left unjustified then
it cannot rightly be called an explanation of why comparativists need not
give up interpersonal comparisons of confidence. Perhaps you might choose
to call it an incomplete or partial explanation—but if that’s what it is, then
the part we’ve been given is not the part we should be worried about.
To help make this clearer, consider a parody explanation of mass-volume
comparisons. (This is an example I’ll come back to again later in the paper.)
Imagine a finite Newtonian universe, ∆, that consists fundamentally of some
array of non-pointlike atoms. The non-atomic objects of this universe are the
arbitrary mereological sums of atoms. There are two special objects worth
highlighting: the ‘null’ object ∅, i.e., the empty arrangement of atoms; and
the universal sum, ∆ itself. Let %m and %v denote the is at least as massive
as and is at least as voluminous as relations respectively. Obviously, ∅ will
sit at the bottom of both %m and %v, while ∆ will sit at the top. Other
than that, though, %m and %v are two distinct orderings corresponding to
two very different physical quantities.
We can define a single ‘addition’ operation which operates same way for
mass and volume: if two objects o1 and o2 share no parts (o1 u o2 = ∅),
then the mass of their mereological sum (o1 t o2) will be the sum of their
individual masses, just as the volume of their mereological sum will be the
sum of their volumes. We can thus define two functions fm and fv which
measure %m and %v respectively, which are such that for all objects o1, o2,
(im) o1 %m o2 iff fm(o1) ≥ fm(o2)
(iim) fm(∆) = 1 and fm(o1) ≥ 0
(iiim) If o1 u o2 = ∅, then fm(o1 t o2) = fm(o1) + fm(o2)
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(iv) o1 %v o2 iff fv(o1) ≥ fv(o2)
(iiv) fv(∆) = 1 and fv(o1) ≥ 0
(iiiv) If o1 u o2 = ∅, then fv(o1 t o2) = fv(o1) + fv(o2)
We can thus construct a notion of distance for both mass and volume using
the same methodology comparativists propose for defining distances in con-
fidence (Krantz et al. 1971). Furthermore, fm and fv belong to the ‘same
model’, as each is the unique interval-preserving measure of their respective
orderings on the same 0-to-1 interval.
Of course, none of this gives us any reason at all to think that mass and
volume are comparable. But suppose I now want to explain how we can in
fact make mass–volume comparisons, and to get the ball rolling I’m going
to help myself to a little assumption:
Mass-Volume Equality. ∆ has as much mass as it does volume, and ∅
has as much mass as it does volume.
Since ∆’s mass just is its volume, and ∅’s mass is its volume, the distance
between ∆’s mass and ∅’s mass is the distance between ∆’s volume and ∅’s
volume—so any fraction of that distance will be equal. Thus, if
fm(∆)− fm(o1) ≤ fv(∆)− fv(o2),
then we say that o1’s mass is at least as great as o2’s volume, which will
be whenever fm(o1) ≥ fv(o2); and all such comparisons will be preserved
whenever mass and volume are measured on ‘the same model’.
So if Mass-Volume Equality is true, then we can make sense of mass-
volume comparisons. But that’s not very interesting, and it doesn’t help
to support the sensibility of mass-volume comparisons. Similarly, if Min-
Max Equality is true, then interpersonal confidence comparisons might
be meaningful under certain conditions. But that conditional isn’t playing
any interesting role in the explanation of how interpersonal comparability
might make sense in the first place. The hard part isn’t to establish the
conditional; it’s to establish the antecedent!
What comparativists need is a justification for Min-Max Equality
(or any other posited equalities between locations in α’s and β’s confidence
rankings). Such a justification needs to explain what’s different between
interpersonal confidence comparisons and mass-volume comparisons, and
it needs to not undermine the support for comparativism more generally.
Without this, the explanation laid out in §2 is no more compelling than the
parody. The question for the remainder of this paper is therefore whether
we can expect that some such justification will be forthcoming.
4 The Functional Role of Absolute Confidence
Now you might be thinking that there’s an obvious difference between in-
terpersonal confidence comparisons and mass-volume comparisons. On the
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one hand, it’s clearly not useful in any sense to say that fm and fv belong
to ‘the same model’ precisely because mass and volume are very different
physical phenomena. On the other hand, however, you might think that it’s
sensible to say pα and pβ belong to the ‘same model’, and hence to compare
between them, because they’re models of similar psychological phenomena.
Well, that’s not going to be quite enough to justify Min-Max Equality.
On the comparativist’s picture, pα and pβ are interval-preserving measures
of two distinct psychological quantities: there’s confidence-for-α (underwrit-
ten by %α), and there’s confidence-for-β (underwritten by %β). Now %α and
%β are clearly similar to one another in many respects—but then so too are
%m and %v, so pointing out similarities in the underlying rankings won’t
justify Min-Max Equality. Nor can the fact that confidence-for-α and
confidence-for-β play psychologically similar roles be enough to justify that
assumption. After all, it’s also true that utility-for-α (underwritten by α’s
preferences) and utility-for-β (underwritten by β’s preferences) play psycho-
logically similar roles, and yet we certainly shouldn’t take that as sufficient
evidence that interpersonal utility comparisons are therefore meaningful.3
So mere psychological similarity isn’t going to suffice to justify Min-Max
Equality.
But maybe there’s a little more that can be said in favour of Min-Max
Equality on this front. The rough idea would be this: the psychological
state that α is in when she has P sitting at the top of her confidence ranking
plays the same functional role to the psychological state that β is in when β
has P sitting at the top of her confidence ranking; and likewise for the states
α and β are in when they have P sitting at the bottom of their confidence
rankings. If so, then the sameness of functional roles might entitle us to
say that they are the same psychological state. Or, at the very least, the
sameness of functional role makes it more plausible that the maxima and
the minima of α’s and β’s confidence rankings are not only comparable but
indeed equal in strength. Let’s call this the same-role response.
I do not think that the same-role response is successful. The problem,
as I see it, is that the response supports Min-Max Equality only at the
cost of undermining comparativism more generally. To get clearer on this,
let’s flesh the idea out in a bit more detail. On the usual comparativist’s
picture, if pα and pβ are the unique interval-preserving measures of α’s and
β’s confidence rankings on the 0-to-1 scale, then these functions can be
plugged into our standard numerical models of decision-making to predict
α’s and β’s utilities for certain kinds of gambles relative to their utilities
3 To be explicit: I am assuming that utility-for-α is an interval-preserving measure of
α’s preferences; likewise for β. I’m therefore assuming that rational agents have preferences
that are measurable as such. This should be generally uncontroversial. I am not arguing
that interpersonal utility comparisons are meaningless. I do happen to think that they
are meaningless, but right now I’m only noting that the mere fact that utility-for-α and
utility-for-β are psychologically similar does not imply that they’re comparable.
9
for the outcomes of those gambles. Taking a simplified version of ordinary
expected utility theory as our main example, the utility uα that a rational
agent like α assigns to a gamble
Γ = 〈Q if P, R otherwise〉
is a function of the utilities she assigns to Q and R, and the degree of
confidence she assigns to P :4





Where α prefers Q to R, we can rearrange this to give:




This is just another way to say that the utility α assigns to Γ will sit pα(P )
of the distance from α’s utility for R to her utility for Q. So, if P is maximal
in %α and %β then pα(P ) = pβ(P ) = 1, and α and β both will be indifferent
between Q and Γ. Likewise, if P is minimal in %α and %β then pα(P ) =
pβ(P ) = 0, and they will be indifferent between R and Γ.
Supposing that all this is correct, then I think it would be perfectly
plausible to say that a proposition’s sitting at the top (bottom) of α’s confi-
dence ranking plays the same functional role in relation to utilities for α as a
proposition’s sitting at the top (bottom) of β’s confidence ranking plays for
β. But you know what other states would also play the same functional roles
across α and β? If P sits half of the way between > and ⊥ on α’s confidence
ranking, then the utility α assigns to Γ will sit half of the distance from
uα(R) to uα(Q). Similarly, if P sits a quarter way between > and ⊥ on α’s
confidence ranking, then the utility α assigns to Γ will sit a quarter of the
distance from uα(R) to uα(Q).
In general, the same-role response has us identify some of α’s and β’s psy-
chological states by virtue of those states’ functional roles: being maximally-
ranked in %α and %β counts equally as 100% confidence for both α and β
because (according to the usual comparativist theory) those states behave
in the same way with respect to utilities; and likewise for 0% confidence,
mutatis mutandis. But why did we stop there? What we’ve been describing
are specific instances of much more general way of defining any state of ab-
solute confidence directly by its functional relationship with utilities. That
is, α and β are both x% confident that P if they’re in a state the functional
role of which leads them to assign a utility to Γ that is x% of the distance
from the utility they assign to R to the utility they assign to Q. Or in other




4 I’m here presupposing in what follows that there are some Q and R such that α
prefers Q to R; and to keep things simple I’m assuming that α is indifferent between Q
and (Q ∧ P ), and between R and (R ∧ ¬P ).
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But now comparative confidence has dropped out of the picture. To charac-
terise α’s degree of confidence regarding P in this way I don’t need to know
where P sits relative to other propositions in %α. And that’s because once
we start characterising confidence by reference to these kinds of functional
roles, α’s confidence regarding P is not in the first instance being treated
as an index that represents the location of P relative to other propositions
in a confidence ranking, but rather as a measure, roughly, of the degree to
which α is willing to bet on P .5
(I’ll note, by the way, that the point here doesn’t rest too heavily on the
specific decision model I’ve used. Compare the simple expected utility theory
I’ve been presupposing with something like Buchak’s (2013) risk-weighted
utility theory. Unlike the expected utility model, which says (where Q is
preferred to R):




Buchak posits a (strictly increasing) risk function, rα : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], with
rα(0) = 0 and rα(1) = 1, that’s intended to represent α’s attitude towards
risk; and then asks us to calculate utilities like so:






Assuming pα, uα, and rα are understood to represent distinct psychological
phenomena with distinct functional roles, we can characterise a given state
of absolute confidence by its functional relationships with utilities and risk
attitudes:







If α is risk-neutral, then r−1α (n) = n, and there’s no difference between a
gamble’s risk-weighted utility and its expected utility. So given risk-weighted
utility theory as our underlying decision model we could treat ‘pα(P ) = x’
as a measure of α’s willingness to bet on P if she were risk neutral. But the
key point is just that what it is for α be confident that P to degree x can be
characterised functionally in terms of that state’s functional relationships
with other states posited within some decision theory, including at least but
perhaps not limited to its relationship with utilities, and without referring
to P ’s relative location in a confidence ranking.)
5 Following Eriksson and Hájek (2007), you might worry here about so-called ‘Zen
monk’ cases, or agents who are indifferent amongst all things. I have responded to this
problem elsewhere (Elliott forthcomingb). In short: a functional characterisation of α’s
confidence states isn’t given in terms how those states interact with her actual utilities/
preferences, but their potential interactions with different utility/preference states she
could be in. If α is actually indifferent amongst all things, then she can still be in a state
the typical causal role of which would only become apparent if she were to no longer be
universally indifferent.
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The argument here is that we don’t get to pick and choose when we
appeal to similar functional roles: if we’re going to use the functional roles
of confidence states in connection with other psychological phenomena to
characterise what it is for agents to have 100% confidence that P , or 0%
confidence that P , then we should recognise when the same functionalist
definitions can be used to characterise what it is for those agents to have
x% confidence that P for any x between 0 and 100—i.e., without at any
point mentioning the agent’s comparative confidences—and not appeal to
functionalism only when it suits the theory we’re trying to support. If the
same-role response does anything to support Min-Max Equality, then it’s
only at the cost of undermining comparativism more generally.6
5 When Comparisons Are Meaningful
So perhaps it’s not so easy to justify Min-Max Equality. And in fact I
think we have good general reasons to think that no compelling justification
will be forthcoming. The key question to ask is: when does it make sense to
draw comparisons between quantities?
Well, it’s precisely when those comparisons aren’t reliant on any unforced
or arbitrary choices relating to the format of the representations used. And
across all clearly meaningful instances of comparability—both with respect
to physical quantities as well as biological, psychological, or sociopolitical
quantities—there are four general kinds of case where this is true. So the goal
of this section is to argue that if comparativism were true and interpersonal
confidence comparisons were indeed meaningful, then they would be quite
unlike any of these four standard kinds of cases.
(That’s consistent with interpersonal confidence comparisons being a
unique case, of course—but then wouldn’t it be so much nicer to have a
theory on which interpersonal confidence comparisons aren’t distinct from
other forms of quantitative comparisons?)
Let q1 and q2 designate two (not necessarily distinct) quantities for
which it makes some sense to talk about ‘distances’ and ratios thereof. Every
such quantity q induces an ordering, %q, over the kinds of things for which
that quantity is attributable; e.g., mass and volume induce the orderings
6 I’ll flag here that I think there are further problems with the same-role response.
I’ve been granting for the sake of argument that if two agents have identical coherent
and continuous confidence rankings, then they have identical absolute confidences. But
that’s a commitment of Stefánsson’s comparativism, not a self-evident truth. It is, at least
arguably, conceptually possible for two agents to have identical confidence rankings and
yet attach different absolute confidences to propositions at the same ‘locations’ within
their respective rankings (including the minima and maxima). This includes cases where
the differences in absolute confidence between the agents are systematically reflected by
differences in their preferences as predicted by an underlying decision theory, and are thus
functionally distinct according to that theory. This is however a very general problem for
comparativism that I’ve discussed elsewhere (Elliott forthcominga), and I don’t want to
dwell on it further here.
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%m and %v over the space of concrete objects respectively. So let fq1 be
an interval-preserving measure of %q1 , and likewise let fq2 be an interval-
preserving measure of %q2 . Then the four kinds of circumstances where it
unambiguously makes sense to draw q1–q2 comparisons from the values
assigned by fq1 and fq2 are:
C1. q1 = q2 and fq1 = fq2
C2. q1 = q2 and fq1 6= fq2 , but we know how to translate between fq1 and
fq2
C3. q1 6= q2, but both the q1-facts and the q2-facts can be re-expressed in
terms of a single theoretically more basic quantity, q3
C4. q1 6= q2, but both q1 and q2 are dimensionless
In the remainder of this section I’ll describe these in turn, and I’ll argue
that if comparativism were true then interpersonal confidence comparisons
could fit none of these patterns.
Cases C1 and C2
These are the simplest and most obvious cases. An example of C1 would
be if we have a single quantity, mass, measured on a single numerical scale,
kilograms; and in this case we can draw mass-mass comparisons between
any two objects by reading the comparisons directly off of the numerical
values they’re assigned on the kilogram scale. An example of C2 would then
be when we have the one quantity mass measured on two different scales,
e.g., kilograms and pounds. Here we can draw mass-mass comparisons on
the basis of the values assigned by the two scales whenever we know how to
translate between those scales.
Comparativism obviously cannot directly appeal to C1 and C2. As every
quantity induces an ordering over the domain appropriate to that quantity,
we can use those orderings to differentiate between quantities—in the sense
that if %q1 6= %q2 , then q1 6= q2.7 And since %α 6= %β, confidence-for-α is
not the same quantity as confidence-for-β. So that rules out C1 and C2.
Case C3
Here’s a simple example of C3: by stipulating the directions for up, for-
wards, and across, we can order objects by height, length, or width, and in
that way we can make sense of these as three distinct quantities—each cor-
responds to a distinct relation over concrete objects. But we usually don’t
think of these as interestingly distinct quantities, and the reason is that all
7 In saying this I’m taking no stand on whether quantitative facts are anything over
and above relational facts (see Dasgupta 2013 for discussion). Even if you think there’s
more to the facts about a quantity than its relational facts, you’ll still agree that every
quantity determines some relational facts that we can then use to differentiate between
them.
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the relevant facts about each can be re-expressed using a single more basic
quantity, spatial distance, plus a direction. Thus it makes perfect sense to
compare o1’s height to o2’s length or to o3’s width, precisely because those
comparisons reduce to more fundamental spatial distance comparisons that
are then clearly meaningful under either pattern C1 or C2.
C3 is the standard pattern by which theorists will attempt to render
cross-quantitative comparisons meaningful (with the exception of C4, which
only applies in the case of dimensionless quantities). For example, if you
want to compare aesthetic to pragmatic value, for instance, or gustatory to
audible to tactile pleasure, then the usual strategy is to try to reduce both
to a more basic measure—‘overall value’, ‘overall pleasure’—under which it
makes sense to trade them off against one another. And where it’s not clear
how to reduce distinct quantities to a common underlying measure, this is
usually seen as compelling evidence of incomparability.
So can the comparativist make appeal to something like C3 to explain
how confidence-for-α is comparable to confidence-for-β? Well, they’d need
to show that there’s a more fundamental quantity of which these are just
‘aspects’—something like confidence simpliciter. But what grounds this more
fundamental quantity, and on what basis is it measured? Not on the basis
of any individual’s confidence ranking: if confidence-for-α and confidence-
for-β are going to be reducible to confidence simpliciter, then any method
of measuring the latter would need to be independent of the subjective
properties of α’s and β’s confidence rankings. But the point of comparativism
was to show how absolute confidence arises for each agent out of that agent’s
subjective confidence ranking—so who’s confidence ranking is going to be
the basis for plain ol’ confidence?
And this, by the way, lets us see more clearly what’s so problematic about
the assumption of Min-Max Equality. Compare again the comparison of
mass and volume. It’s nonsense to compare these two quantities, and the
ultimate reason for this is that there’s no common measure to which the facts
about both are reducible. The assumption of Mass-Volume Equality
amounts to stipulating a common measure out of thin air: location relative
to ∅’s mass-volume and ∆’s mass-volume. But of course you need to first
establish a common measure of mass and volume before you can justify
equating any two points between a measure of mass and a measure of volume.
So the task for comparativists is to establish the existence of a plau-
sible common measure. This is exactly what the same-role response does,
essentially by re-expressing confidence-for-α and confidence-for-β in terms
of a common measure of confidence simpliciter characterised by their shared
functional role. But the same-role response undermines comparativism as a
whole, and now we can see that the basic reason for this is in fact quite
general: we cannot say that confidence-for-α and confidence-for-β are both
reducible to a single common (and therefore non-subjective) measure with-
out also giving up on the idea that the facts about each agent’s states of
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absolute confidence are grounded in the particular way that agent orders
propositions by relative confidence. You can have one or the other—and if
you want the latter, then you cannot have C3.
Case C4
So finally, C4. A quantity q is dimensionless when it is defined in terms
of other quantities q′, q′′, ..., in such a way that the units of the latter
quantities ‘cancel out’. For example, the refractive index, n, of a substance
is the ratio of the speed of light c in a vacuum in unit distance per unit time,
to the phase velocity p of light in the medium of that substance as measured







Because the distance/time’s in the denominator and the numerator cancel each
other out, the refractive index n doesn’t have ‘units’ in the same way that
measurements of distance and duration typically do. Instead, it is a simple
ratio between the two real values c and p. Likewise, the relative density, r,
of a substance is a ratio of the density s of a given substance (in unit mass








Now, although refractive indices and relative densities are very different
quantities from one another, and there’s no more basic quantity of which
both are merely ‘aspects’ à la C3, it still makes perfect sense to say that
the refractive index of some medium is greater than its relative density. As
neither quantity has units, the comparison is independent of any arbitrary
choice of units—indeed, we’re essentially just saying that one ratio is bigger
than another ratio.
We can rule out C4 simply by noting that confidence-for-α would not be
dimensionless if comparativism were true. Again: the comparativist’s view
is that the facts about an agent’s absolute confidences are derived from the
facts about their confidence ranking, rather than defined as a ratio of values
in some further psychological quantity or quantities. So that rules out C4.
Before I close this section, let me briefly consider a possible response.8
You might be thinking that given any interval-preserving measure f of %α,
confidence-for-α can be “redefined” as a dimensionless ratio of differences




8 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this suggestion.
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And if we do the same for %β then we have two dimensionless quantities that
can now be compared. But it’s important to note here that a dimensionless
quantity is always defined in terms of some other quantity/quantities. It’s
nonsensical to say that confidence-for-α is a dimensional quantity measured
by f and that it’s “redefinable” in terms of f as a dimensionless quantity.
A quantity cannot be both dimensional and dimensionless, and if f is a
measure of confidence-for-α, then the dimensionless quantity defined from
f isn’t.
What’s really happening here isn’t a “redefinition” of confidence-for-α,
but the defining of a new dimensionless quantity: distance from > on an
interval-preserving measure of %α. That’s a perfectly well-defined (if not
especially interesting) quantity, but it’s not confidence-for-α. And this is
important, because if this redefinition strategy were sensible then we could








and voilà we can now compare “mass” and “volume”! But of course we
cannot use this strategy to make sense of mass–volume comparisons, because
“mass” and “volume” aren’t mass and volume.
To reiterate what I said above, any strategy for making sense of interper-
sonal confidence comparisons ought to show what’s different between them
and mass-volume comparisons; otherwise, applicability to the latter stands
as a reductio of the former.
6 Confidence as Dimensionless
I think the right way to understand absolute confidence is by its relationship
with utilities and preferences, in the manner I’ve been describing. For lack of
a better name, lets just call this the functionalist view. This is a view that
I’ve defended in several works (Elliott 2017, forthcomingb, forthcominga).
To close the paper, let me say a few things specifically in relation to how
the view handles interpersonal comparisons of confidence.
First, on the functionalist’s picture, α’s absolute confidence for any propo-
sition P is a dimensionless quantity. The value pα(P ) is a ratio of two dis-
tances in utility—the distance between uα(Γ) and uα(R), and the distance




Since the denominator and the numerator have the same units, they’ll cancel
each other out, leaving us with the dimensionless pα(P ). And since pα and
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pβ measure dimensionless quantities for both α and β, it makes perfect sense
to compare across them. Note that this is true regardless of what specific
scales we use to measure α’s and β’s utilities, so long as that measure is
interval-preserving; and consequently, at no point did we need to assume
that α’s and β’s utilities are interpersonally comparable. Moreover, since pα
and pβ are defined in the same way by reference to their similar functional
roles in relation to α’s and β’s utilities respectively, it’s not only meaningful
but also useful to compare across them. For instance, if pα(P ) > pβ(Q),
then α will be more willing to bet on P than β is on Q (ceteris paribus).
This is the key insight of the same-role response, and it applies with all the
more force for the functionalist view.
Interestingly, the language with which we attribute degrees of confidence
also fits the pattern of dimensionless quantity attributions. To avoid ambi-
guity, attributions of dimensional quantities like length, mass, and temper-
ature require specification of a unit. For instance, in most contexts we need
to say ‘o has a length of 10 meters’ or ‘o weighs 10 kilograms’. But because
dimensionless quantities have no units we say, e.g., ‘water has a refractive
index of 1.33’, or ‘wood has a relative permeability of 0.9’. Likewise, we say
‘α believes p to degree x’—not ‘α believes p with x credals’, as one ought
to expect if confidence were a dimensional quantity like the comparativist
proposes. Or more instructively: we naturally understand and describe con-
fidence in terms of percentages, which are just another way of representing
dimensionless ratios.
So, the functionalist view has a neat explanation of interpersonal confi-
dence comparisons. The explanation does not rely on any arbitrary choice
of units, nor on any controversial presuppositions of interpersonal compa-
rability, or on questionable equivalences between the relative positions of
propositions on an agent’s confidence ranking and how confident the agent
is regarding those propositions. It also fits nicely with the ways we talk about
confidence, both in our formal theories and in everyday speech. Compared
to comparativism, then, the functionalist view has a lot going for it when
it comes to explaining interpersonal comparisons. But even if you don’t like
my proposed alternative, it’s clear enough that comparativists are in need of
a better response to the problem of interpersonal confidence comparisons.9
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